Chaos International met en ligne un nouvel article dans la rubrique Fil d'Ariane.
Il s'agit d'un texte de Daniel Drache dressant un bilan critique des commissions Sutherland et Warwick sur l'avenir de l'OMC (Organisation Mondiale du Commerce).
Abstract
This paper examines the attempt by the 2004 Sutherland and the 2007 Warwick Reports to reform the process of decision-making of the WTO after the collapse of the Cancun ministerial. Among WTO insiders was the fear that negotiations had gone off the rails and member states had lost their interest in concluding the Doha Round. The transfer of power from the club where few decided for the many to the coalition model of trade negotiations where the many decided for the many revealed large organizational imbalances. As a membership organization, the WTO does not have an executive body or management board to steer it or to interact in a regular and purposeful way with civil society. The powerful dispute resolution system overshadows a weak and ineffective decision-making procedure. Of all the international bodies, the WTO’s institutional architecture makes it a flashpoint particularly for the global South and the newly empowered coalitions like the G20 and G33. Sharp organizational differences about the role of the Director-General, Committee Chairs and the way negotiations are conducted contribute to the feelings of estrangement among members. The irony is not lost on many observers who note that although the WTO demands tough transparency standards from its members’ trade practices, it relies on informality in the way it has conducted negotiations. Not surprisingly without any alternative model of governance neither reform effort had an impact on the way the WTO does business. With their ambiguity, blandness, and shortcomings, these high-level bodies did not address the imbalance between the formal legalism of the WTO’s rules and its rule-bending institutional practices. Nor did they propose an acceptable common ground for reform, one that would bridge the deep divisions between members and the G20/G33 coalitions. A critical reading of the Reports reveals that the WTO remains hostage to its narrow gauge legal culture and its inability to rebalance the relationship between law and politics, the DNA of its operating system.
Abstract
This paper examines the attempt by the 2004 Sutherland and the 2007 Warwick Reports to reform the process of decision-making of the WTO after the collapse of the Cancun ministerial. Among WTO insiders was the fear that negotiations had gone off the rails and member states had lost their interest in concluding the Doha Round. The transfer of power from the club where few decided for the many to the coalition model of trade negotiations where the many decided for the many revealed large organizational imbalances. As a membership organization, the WTO does not have an executive body or management board to steer it or to interact in a regular and purposeful way with civil society. The powerful dispute resolution system overshadows a weak and ineffective decision-making procedure. Of all the international bodies, the WTO’s institutional architecture makes it a flashpoint particularly for the global South and the newly empowered coalitions like the G20 and G33. Sharp organizational differences about the role of the Director-General, Committee Chairs and the way negotiations are conducted contribute to the feelings of estrangement among members. The irony is not lost on many observers who note that although the WTO demands tough transparency standards from its members’ trade practices, it relies on informality in the way it has conducted negotiations. Not surprisingly without any alternative model of governance neither reform effort had an impact on the way the WTO does business. With their ambiguity, blandness, and shortcomings, these high-level bodies did not address the imbalance between the formal legalism of the WTO’s rules and its rule-bending institutional practices. Nor did they propose an acceptable common ground for reform, one that would bridge the deep divisions between members and the G20/G33 coalitions. A critical reading of the Reports reveals that the WTO remains hostage to its narrow gauge legal culture and its inability to rebalance the relationship between law and politics, the DNA of its operating system.
